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The Solar Dynamics Observatory is an Explorer-class mission that will launch 
in early 2009. The spacecraft will operate in a geosynchronous orbit, sending 
data 24 hours a day to a devoted ground station in White Sands, New Mexico. It 
will carry a suite of instruments designed to observe the Sun in multiple 
wavelengths at unprecedented resolution. The Atmospheric Imaging Assembly 
includes four telescopes with focal plane CCDs that can image the full solar disk 
in four different visible wavelengths. The Extreme-ultraviolet Variability 
Experiment will collect time-correlated data on the activity of the Sun's corona. 
The Helioseismic and Magnetic Imager will enable study of pressure waves 
moving through the body of the Sun. 
The attitude control system on Solar Dynamics Observatory is responsible for 
four main phases of activity. The physical safety of the spacecraft after 
separation must be guaranteed. Fine attitude determination and control must be 
sufficient for instrument calibration maneuvers. The mission science mode 
requires 2-arcsecond control according to error signals provided by guide 
telescopes on the Atmospheric Imaging Assembly, one of the three instruments 
to be carried. Lastly, accurate execution of linear and angular momentum 
changes to the spacecraft must be provided for momentum management and 
orbit maintenance. 
In t h~s  paper, single-fault tolerant fault detection and correction of the Solar 
Dynamics Observatory attitude control system is described. The attitude control 
hardware suite for the mission is catalogued, with special attention to 
redundancy at the hardware level. Four reaction wheels are used where any three 
are satisfactory. Four pairs of redundant thrusters are employed for orbit change 
maneuvers and momentum management. Three two-axis gyroscopes provide 
full redundancy for rate sensing. A digital Sun sensor and two autonomous star 
trackers provide two-out-of-three redundancy for fine attitude determination. 
The use of software to maximize chances of recovery from any hardware or 
software fault is detailed. A generic fault detection and correction software 
structure is used, allowing additions, deletions, and adjustments to fault 
detection and correction rules. This software structure is fed by in-line fault tests 
that are also able to take appropriate actions to avoid corruption of the data 
stream. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO) mission is the first Space Weather Research Network 
mission, part of NASA's Living With a Star This program seeks to understand the 
changing Sun and its effects on the Solar System, life, and society. To this end, the SDO 
spacecraft will carry three Sun-observing instruments to geosynchronous orbit: Helioseismic and 
Magnetic Imager (HMI), led by Stanford University; Atmospheric Imaging Assembly (AIA), led 
by Lockheed Martin Space and Astrophysics Laboratory; and Extreme-ultraviolet Variability 
Experiment (EVE), led by the University of Colorado. The HMI will enable study of pressure 
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waves moving through the body of the Sun. The AIA includes four telescopes with focal plane 
CCDs that can image the full solar disk in four different visible wavelengths. The EVE will 
collect time-correlated data on ,the activity of the Sun's corona. Links describing the instruments 
in more detail may be found through the SDO web site.2 
SDO will launch in early 2009. Its basic mission goals are to observe the Sun for a very high 
percentage of the spacecraft lifetime with long stretches of uninterrupted observations and to 
transmit these data continuously at a high data rate to a dedicated ground station. The SDO 
mission lifetime is 10 years, with a minimum mission success lifetime of 5 years. These science 
collection and longevity goals guided the design of the spacecraft bus that will cany and service 
the three-instrument payload. At the time of this publication, the SDO spacecraft bus is well into 
the integration and testing phase at the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). A three- 
axis stabilized attitude control system (ACS) is needed both to point the instruments at the Sun 
accurately and to keep the roll about the Sun vector correctly positioned relative to the solar 
rotational axis. This paper will describe the SDO ACS and the methods by which it can 
guarantee science performance throughout the mission despite any one of a number of possible 
failure scenarios. 
HARDWARE COMPLEMENT 
The SDO ACS has been designed to tolerate any single hardware fault and yet still retain 
capability to meet all requirements for science data quality. To this end, ACS sensors, actuators 
and computational capabilities have been selected and arranged both for performance and 
maximal redundancy. SDO ACS failure detection and correction depends to a large extent on 
hardware redundancies, so the hardware complement and its redundancies will be described in 
detail. Figure 1 shows a mechanical drawing of the SDO. Please see Reference 3 for more 
information on hardware placement. 
ACS Sensors 
The SDO sensor suite comprises sixteen Adcole coarse Sun sensors (CSS), one Adcole digital 
Sun sensor (DSS), two Galileo Avionica quaternion-output star trackers (ST), and three Kearfott 
Two-Axis Rate Assemblies (TARA). The CSSs are the only attitude sensors required in the most 
basic Sun pointing mode. The sixteen CSSs are divided into two independent sets of eight 
sensors each, and each set of eight can provide an adequate Sun vector with any seven sensors 
being functional. 
For fine attitude determination, an on-board Kalman filter can provide adequate attitude 
knowledge with input from any two of the three fine pointing units-DSS, ST1, and ST2. To 
avoid multiple blockages, therefore, the STs are mounted nearly perpendicular to the SDO Sun- 
pointing axis (X axis), and far enough apart from each other that the Earth and Moon do not 
block both at the same time throughout the science collection phase of the mission. The TARAs 
are arranged with their insensitive axes orthogonal to one another, such that sensitive axes from 
two units are aligned with each of the three body axes of the Observatory. Thus, the loss of any 
single TARA still allows full three-axis rate information to be obtained. 
In addition to the ACS suite described here, the ACS also makes extensive use of the guide 
telescopes (GT) mounted as part of the AIA instrumentation. Because the accuracy of images 
taken by SDO will be unprecedented, the ACS is expected to guide the spacecraft trusting the 
processed GT data as the best available knowledge of the Sun center. There are four GTs, with 
one mounted to each of the four science telescopes; the ACS only needs accurate information 
from one of the four GTs, identified as the controlling guide telescope (CGT), to perform its 
science control duties. Each GT is capable of providing attitude information relative to the Sun 
vector accurate to about 2 arcseconds within about 90 arcseconds of its centerline. This portion 
of the field of view (FOV) is called the linear range, and is required for accurate science data 
collection. Outside of that range, polarity is maintained as long as the center of the Sun remains 
within the 0.5-deg FOV, which allows sunlight to fall on one or more photodiodes. The 
controller that uses the GT can acquire the linear range given proper initialization in the full 
FOV, so the full FOV is called the acquisition range. 
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Figure 1: The Solar Dynamics Observatory 
ACS Actuators 
SDO guidance functions will be actuated by four General Dynamics 70-Nms reaction wheel 
assemblies (RWA) and eight Arnpac 5-lbf attitude control engines, or thrusters. The RWAs are 
arranged in a pyramidal structure, so that any set of three provides full three-axis control 
capability. The ACS thrusters are grouped into four pairs of thrusters, with one thruster of each 
pair linked to fuel and oxidizer by independent manifolds. In this way, the catastrophic failure of 
any one thruster can only require the closing of one manifold, leaving the other set of four 
capable of performing all necessary ACS tasks. 
In addition to attitude control activities, the ACS is also responsible for the guidance and control 
of the two high-gain antennas (HGA) because it already has access to the necessary navigational 
information. Each antenna consists of a dish mounted on an elevation gimbal, with that mounted 
on an azimuth gimbal. Either antenna may fail, either from losing a gimbal or fiom other 
electrical failure, and the mission can still be completed. The greatest danger posed by the HGAs 
is the irradiation of the spacecraft itself; HGA FDC provides additional protection from that 
event. 
Electronics and Microprocessors 
A fully-capable copy of the command and data handling system of the SDO spacecraft bus 
resides on each of two independent microprocessors, here referred to as the main processors 
(MP). Only one of these MPs is in control of the spacecraft at any time. Each of these MPs also 
operates an independent copy of the attitude control task (ACT) and the on-board ephemeris. 
Most flight software tasks, including the ACT, operate on a 200-msec cycle, except that the 
ephemeris operates on a 1-sec cycle. The ACT samples sensor data and issues actuator 
commands at this 5-Hz rate, and it is this task that, if all goes perfectly nominally throughout the 
mission, will maintain attitude control of the spacecraft. There are also separate microprocessors 
that reside in each of two independent but cross-strapped attitude control electronics (ACE) 
boxes. These ACEs are always powered, but only one can be in control at any time. The ACE 
that is in control routes data from the CSSs, RWAs, TARAs, and various pressure and 
temperature sensors to the MPs. It also accepts and validates actuator commands to the RWAs 
and the propulsion system's valves and thrusters from the MP in control. The ACEs also run 
their software tasks on a 200-msec cycle. Similarly, there are two independent gimbal control 
electronics (GCE) boxes and two independent power service electronics (PSE) boxes. 
If there is a disruption of ACT control over the ACE in control, that ACE will cease passing 
through ACT actuator commands and will instead begin issuing commands of its own to the 
reaction wheels. The control system running on the ACE is simplified, being dependent only on 
the CSSs and the RWA tachometer readings (during eclipse, if TARA signals are available, they 
are used to null rates). If the primary ACE itself is disrupted, such as from a power down due to a 
single-event upset (SEU), the other ACE will detect this state and assume control. The details of 
the algorithms for arbitration between the two ACE will be discussed in a later section. From the 
state of either ACE issuing safety commands, the Observatory may be recovered to nominal 
operations once one or the other MP is available for commanding. 
ATTITUDE DETERMINATION AND CONTROL MODES 
The ACS has four RWA-actuated modes and two thruster-actuated modes. More details about 
the ACS in general and the control modes in particular can be found in Refs. [3-61. As discussed 
in the previous section, one RWA-actuated mode resides on the ACE microprocessors; this mode 
is called Safehold. The other five modes reside in the ACT. Sun Acquisition (SunAcq) performs 
an attitude hnction similar to Safehold, in that it simply maintains a power-positive, safe attitude 
with respect to the Sun using CSS signals. It differs from Safehold in that TARA signals are used 
for angular rate information at all times. 
For all other modes, attitude determination (AD) is performed with some combination of the fine 
attitude sensors and propagation of TARA-derived rate information. An attitude solution may be 
initialized either by accepting a valid ST quaternion (nominal) or by uploading an estimate by 
ground command (available for testing and contingency). Once a solution is available, it may be 
simply propagated using rate sensors, as is always done in the thruster based modes, or it may be 
updated either using one preferred ST or by ground override command. The most accurate 
solution is obtained by combining all available fine attitude data from the two STs, the DSS, and 
the TARAs using a Kalman filter. 
Whatever AD method is selected in the software, Inertial mode uses the solution for attitude 
error calculation against the target attitude in all three axes. Inertial mode has two sub-modes that 
differ only in the target calculation---one tracks a Sun-referenced target quaternion, using the on- 
board ephemeris to predict the appropriate inertially referenced quaternion for the Sun- 
referenced state, and the other maintains a commanded absolute inertially referenced quaternion. 
Science mode, during which most science data are collected, uses one of the specialized GTs to 
point a commanded science reference boresight (SRB) accurately at the Sun. The roll error about 
that SRB is calculated using the same methods as Inertial mode, except that the target is always 
Sun-referenced. 
The thruster modes are called DeltaH and DeltaV. DeltaH is used to manage system angular 
momentum. With no magnetic torquers to gradually dump momentum, the thrusters must be 
used occasionally to remove momentum. To maximize time between uses of DeltaH, the mode 
allows a non-zero angular momentum to be placed into the body, which can be set opposite any 
predicted angular momentum change over a period of approximately four weeks. The attitude 
target for DeltaH is simply the attitude estimate at mode entry. DeltaV is used for changing or 
maintaining orbit parameters. It uses an absolute, inertially referenced target similar to Inertial's 
absolute targeting, and that target may be updated by command during a DeltaV maneuver. 
Some transitions between modes are not allowed. By placing the in-control ACE into Safehold 
mode, the ACS mode running on the MP is ignored, so Safehold may be reached from any MP 
mode. Any MP mode may transition to SunAcq or to Inertial, including self-transitions. Science 
mode is the only other mode that may self-transition, and it may also be entered autonomously 
from Inertial mode when the Sun is in the field-of-view of the controlling guide telescope. 
DeltaH may be entered from SunAcq or Inertial mode. However, Science and DeltaV may only 
be entered from Inertial mode, with Science accessible only when Sun-referenced targeting is 
active and DeltaV accessible only when absolute targeting is active. These restrictions avoid 
large attitude changes occurring due only to misunderstandings of the two targeting sub-modes 
in Inertial. It is worth noting for this topic that thrusters are always disabled upon exiting DeltaH 
or DeltaV modes. Figure 2 is a diagram of the SDO ACS control modes and allowed transitions. 
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Figure 2: Allowed mode transitions for SDO ACS software 
FAULT DETECTION AND CORRECTION 
As has been pointed out in the previous sections, SDO is completely hardware redundant to 
allow the spacecraft to be single fault tolerant. SDO has a long mission life, and one of the 
primary goals of the SDO mission includes collecting long periods of uninterrupted science data. 
So, along with the redundant hardware, the spacecraft has also implemented on-board monitoring 
of the system such that if a fault is detected, corrective action can autonomously be taken to 
utilize the redundant hardware and place the spacecraft into a safe configuration until the ground 
can intervene to correct the fault. In some instances, software reconfiguration or operational 
changes may be needed to regain full capability. The failure correction philosophy is to 
configure the system for the possibility of any single fault, with flexibility to protect against 
subsequent faults after the first fault is understood. The on-board FDC is handled in two separate 
ways that work together to protect the system in an overall manner. The first way consists of 
checks and corrective actions taken within the flight software code itself (i.e. within the ACS 
sensor data processing or within the on-board ephemeris task). The second way is to monitor 
telemetry and initiate corrective action using separate, devoted software tasks. 
In-Line Checking 
From the ACS perspective, the first line of defense against faults resides within the code of the 
ACT, on-board ephemeris, and ACE. These in-line responses operate every time the code 
executes (5 Hz cycle for ACT and ACE, and 1 Hz cycle for ephemeris). On a cycle-by-cycle 
basis, they protect the system by preventing faults in one part of the ACS from propagating 
throughout the rest of the system. At their most basic, these checks protect the system from 
problems such as divide-by-zero errors or loss of accuracy in quaternions due to processor 
truncation. In addition, they also protect against some faults that could potentially be hardware 
failures. A simple example of in-line protection against hardware problems is the checks on the 
analog-to-digital converters (ADC) of the CSS signals. If the CSS ADC fails, flags are set that 
indicate that the CSS data for the current cycle are invalid and, therefore, the last valid CSS data 
are used in the SunAcq controller until new valid data are received. 
As a more complex example, consider the ST data processing. As was mentioned earlier, the 
SDO STs are quaternion-out trackers. A portion of the data received from the STs includes a 
logical bit that indicates whether or not the ST identified and verified a valid quaternion. Within 
the ST data processing in the ACT, the input data are first checked that the ST-provided validity 
bit indicates a valid, verified quaternion. Then, the quaternions are checked to ensure that their 
norm equals one within a tolerance and that the difference between the current and previous 
quaternions does not exceed the expected movement of the spacecraft. If any of these checks 
fails, the ST data are considered invalid and will not be used in the AD solution for that cycle. In 
addition, the ST processing also checks ephemeris information against attitude to see if the 
Moon, Earth, or Sun lies within exclusion cones of the ST boresights. The STs h c t i o n  such that 
even if one of the bright bodies is within the exclusion zone, the ST could still provide a solution, 
but that solution may not be accurate enough to meet the SDO attitude determination 
requirements. So, if the ST processing predicts that the ST boresight is too close to a bright body, 
the in-line response will flag the ST quaternion as low quality, and so that quaternion will not be 
included in the AD solution for that cycle. Both the validity checks and quality checks protect 
Science and Inertial modes from using an AD solution corrupted by flawed ST data. 
FDC Software Tasks 
The two modules of software that implement the Failure, Detection and Correction functions on 
SDO are the Telemetry and Statistics Monitor (TSM) and Stored Command Processor (SC). 
Both of these modules reside in the MP and have considerable flight heritage on in-house GSFC 
missions. The TSM module performs monitoring of limits and upon detection of threshold 
crossings will send a command to the SC module to perform the corrective action. 
The TSM module receives all spacecraft telemetry packets, and the receipt of telemetry packets 
drives the TSM module. Telemetry packets can originate from other spacecraft software modules 
or other spacecraft subsystems. Each TSM monitor point consists of a telemetry packet 
application identifier (APID), packet offset and telemetry monitor size and mask, 4 thresholds, 
any number of which may have their responses enabled, and an enableldisable flag for the TSM 
itself. Furthermore, each threshold consists of an enableldisable flag, a comparison operator (<, 
>, =, etc.), a threshold limit, a persistence, and the relative time sequence (RTS) that contains the 
corrective action should the TSM activate. 
The SC module consists of an absolute time processor, used mostly by the mission operations 
team, and a relative time processor. The relative time processor stores RTSs and can initiate 
them via one command that calls the number of the desired RTS. An RTS consists of a series of 
spacecraft commands with time delays between them. The time delays may be any integer 
number of seconds. SDO has allocated sufficient memory to have 512 RTSs, each storing up to 
300 bytes of commands. Command sizes are variable and follow CCSDS format; thus, the 
minimum command length is 8 bytes. Each command is also preceded by a 2-byte time delay in 
the RTS. Thus SDO RTSs can contain a maximum of 30 commands each. RTSs can be chained 
by including multiple RTS calls in another RTS if a command sequence does not fit in 300 bytes. 
FDC Guidelines 
Autonomous fault detection and correction for the SDO is designed to allow the spacecraft to 
operate safely without ground contacts or intervention for a minimum of 12 hours. The 
spacecraft places itself into a safe configuration in the event of an anomaly to allow the flight 
operations team (FOT) the opportunity to take fill advantage of system redundancy and 
robustness. Areas where potential mission loss would be mitigated by autonomy include: loss of 
power (e.g. power subsystem, battery, solar array electronics, load shed); loss of attitude control 
(e.g. sensor failure, actuator failure); loss of communication with internal components or with the 
ground (1553 bus, commanding); component over or under temperature (e.g. propulsion, HGA 
system); and loss of control of specific hardware (switched power services, HGA gimbals, 
isolation valves). 
This self-protection capability meets several needs. In the event of difficulties in the ground 
telemetry collection and commanding system, the spacecraft can remain safe despite being out of 
contact for an extended period. Another important goal of on-board autonomy is to simplify 
ground operations by reducing the ground requirement to quickly react to unexpected situations. 
On-board FDC monitors are used to guarantee a power positive and stable attitude configuration. 
The FOT still needs to react but with less urgency, and this translates into economic efficiency. 
Finally, monitoring aspects of on-board FDC reduce FOT workload during mission critical 
events by tracking and summarizing key health and safety telemetry parameters. This in turn 
reduces the need to quickly analyze data recorder dumps, as the spacecraft FDC software 
identifies where key subsystem parameters may be out of expected ranges. 
Fault detection and correction is bound to be a complex process in a closed-loop, multi-input, 
multi-output system like the SDO ACS. In designing the SDO ACS FDC, the goal was not to 
find any kind of true optimization between competing desires for flexibility, comprehensiveness, 
and simplicity, but instead to establish guiding principles that would minimize dangers while 
maximizing the likelihood of mission success. The guiding principles can be summarized as 
follows: 
1. Autonomous monitoring may be done for any factor of interest, but responses are limited 
to health and safety concerns. Each autonomous response is taken to address some 
potential for hardware damage or observatory loss in the absence of corrective action, and 
conversely, each identified single-failure potential for loss has some response which 
should prevent loss from occurring. 
2. The list of possible autonomous responses to contingencies should be as small as 
possible, and the responses should interfere with one another as little as possible. The 
ultimate goal of SDO FDC is to facilitate rapid recovery by a competent FOT, not to 
recover autonomously to a fully operational condition. 
3. Failures on complex spacecraft often result in a cascade of hazardous conditions. A 
concomitant cascade of FDC responses would be unpredictable and may do more harm 
than good. 
The application of these three principles will be pointed out throughout the remainder of this 
paper. The third principle bears some deeper discussion here. Establishing beforehand responses 
to an unknown cascade of failures is inherently difficult. On one hand, immediate response to a 
localized failure could potentially prevent the cascade. However, on the other hand, if the 
response is in a race with a better response for that failure, or is not adequate to the severity of 
the failure, the cascade may be worsened. Or, other responses that might have been useful may 
be less effective after other reconfigurations have occurred. The worst situation from a design 
perspective would be for autonomous responses to push the failure along, malung a system 
unrecoverable when the initial failure need not have received an immediate response. 
To avoid race conditions and detrimental cascades of failures, FDC monitors and associated 
responses are divided into four categories of widening influence: specific hardware faults, ACE 
faults, mode-specific performance faults, and system-level faults. Hardware-specific responses 
focus mainly on the hardware that has been detected to have failed, and attempt to establish a 
safe configuration with a minimum of change. ACE fault responses are mostly independent from 
the other FDC as they focus on selecting which of the two ACES is more trustworthy. Mode- 
specific responses always issue commands to demote to a safer control mode, which are 
responses that do not interfere with other FDC. The most serious or dangerous system-wide 
conditions require the shortest persistence periods before activation of the appropriate RTS. They 
also encompass the possible responses of more specialized responses to mode-specific control 
performance or hardware-specific faults. The following sections discuss specific checks in these 
four categories and how they interact. 
HARDWARE-SPECIFIC FDC 
Most hardware-specific failure detection and correction is done in the ACT software, on a cycle- 
by-cycle basis. This in-line FDC consists of checking incoming sensor, actuator, and processor 
data against expectations, and accepting or rejecting that data as useful for further purposes, such 
as control calculations or attitude determination. Table 1 shows many of the hardware checks 
that are performed and their responses. If a condition merits an in-line response, no persistence is 
given for that response, and the response is numbered 0. If a response is effected by RTS, the 
persistence required by the devoted TSM is given in seconds or minutes, and each TSM-initiated 
response is numbered starting with 1. 
Some responses are common to several types of data processing. When new data are not received 
in a cycle, or when validity limits are exceeded, a frequent response is to output the previously 
calculated valid data to the controllers, and to flag the data as invalid, so that the AD software 
will not use them in updating the Kalman filter. Another frequent response is to notify the 
ground of the fault. These are faults for which the FOT will collect statistics from the TSM 
software, but which do not represent an immediate threat to observatory health and safety. In 
these cases, persistence is unnecessary, because each outage is recorded by the on-board 
software and telemetered to the ground when requested. 
Yet another common technique is to set a special flag when certain expected circumstances arise 
which invalidate a sensor's data. For example, the STs will sometimes be occulted by the Earth, 
and Condition ST-2 helps to manage the system response to those events (as discussed in an 
earlier section). However, since these occultations are expected daily in our mission orbit, FDC 
should not perform any autonomous reconfiguration. So, the flag set in response to Condition 
ST-2 is used to avoid tripping ST-3, which is meant to detect an unexpected loss of track. The 
same technique is used to prevent eclipses from being misinterpreted by FDC as Sun sensor 
failures. 
Responses to GT data are all in-line, and fall into one of two categories. Either the condition is 
consistent with eclipse (GT-2), or the condition is clearly a fault. The GT is only used in Science 
mode, and operationally, the observatory should be switched out of Science mode before eclipse 
occurs. Since this condition is only a threat in Science mode, it is classified as a mode-specific 
test. The hardware responses only set flags that indicate the eclipse or the fault condition, and to 
which the mode-specific checks refer. 
Actuator checks deal mainly with detection and prevention of faulty commands, though the 
propulsion system includes some basic safety checking. The check on the RWA speed is at first 
glance an exception to the principal of eliminating responses to non-safety items, as jitter is only 
a problem for the science data quality (though it is of large ~oncern)~ .  However, since the 
operational plan should never allow system momentum to be high enough for the RWA speed to 
exceed jitter limits, RWA-1 does provide a notification of a failure in the complex angular 
momentum management required of the SDO ACS and the FOT. Note that all thruster 
commands are cancelled in the event of one command failing to meet standards. HGA 
commands are stopped whenever any of several quality checks is failed, and possible irradiation 





: Hardware-Specific Fault Conditions and Associated Responses 
Condition 
CSS counts outside valid range 
7 out of 8 CSS are dark (ACE in control) 
No DSS sun presence 
Response 
0) Use previous value 
0) Set CSS Eclipse Flag 
0) Use previous value and disable use of 
DSS data in KF for this cycle 
No DSS packet update 
ST data packet not received 
0) Use previous value and disable use of 
DSS data in KF for thls cycle 
0) Use previous data & disable use of ST 
data in KF for this cvcle 
ST Boresight is within occultation cone of 
Sun, Moon, or Earth 
Star tracker is not trackmg and not occulted 
Change in integrated angle exceeds limit 
I or ST sets voted out 
0) Flag data as low quality & disable use of 
ST in KF for tlus cycle 
1) Command ST to reset and return to 
track 
0) Use previous value for control & AD 
1) Two out of three voting: 
Angular rate comparison: 
Primary TARA rates vs backup TARA rates 
vs primary ST rates 
a) Reconfigure to back-up TARA if 
back-up TARA agrees with ST 
b) Disable this check if back-up TARA 
Primary TARA rates vs backup TARA rates 
vs DSS-derived rates 
TARA motor current outside limits 
" 
Similar to TARA-2 response 
1) Notify ground 
Photodiode error condition detected 
No Sun on GT 
0) Use previous value and flag GT as 
invalid 
0) Use previous value and set GT 
acauisition flag to FALSE 
No GT Packet Update 
w 
0) Use previous value and flag GT and 
Controlling GT data as invalid 
RWA speed outside allowed range for jitter 
More than one RWA is  ower red off 
0) Set a flag warning that jitter might affect 
the science data 
1) Power On All RWA 
Commanded torque andchange in measured 
speed do not compare for one RWA 
Commanded thruster counts are invalid for 
main engine or any thruster 
Thruster command counts echo not equal to 
commanded counts 
Engine valve tem~erature xceeds limit 
' 1) Disable all "disable wheel" RTSs, and 
disable and power off the RWA 
0) Cancel all thruster commands and set 
flag to indicate commands cancelled 
0) Cancel all thruster commands and set 
flag to indicate commands cancelled 
1) Go to Sun Aca mode 
w 
Elevation gimbal axis angle outside range 
Expected antenna position not equal to 
measured position 
'ersistence 
0) Command 0 pulses to elevation actuator 
and continue tracking in azimuth 
1) Send HGA Stop commands 
Invalid or absent GCE data packet 
HGA is pointing in keep-out zone (i.e. danger 
to science instruments) 
5 sec 
0) Send 0 pulses to both gimbals 
1) Send HGA Stop commands and power 
off Ka-Band transmitter 
1) Send HGA Stop commands and power 











1) 30 sec 
1 sec 
ATTITUDE CONTROL ELECTRONICS (ACE) ARBITRATION 
SDO incorporates two electrically identical ACE boxes; Figure 3 shows an electrical block 
diagram of the ACE. Each ACE interfaces to the observatory over the 1553 bus. The ACE 
provides the interface between a number of ACS sensors, all of the ACS actuators, and the 
observatory. The ACE also serves as the platform for the Safehold control mode that is executed 
by the Subsystem Data Node (SDN) contained in each ACE. Since a transition into Safehold is 
not considered a failure in itself, it was a goal that the ACES be able to arbitrate control authority 
between the ACT and themselves without the intervention of the main processor. 
Each ACE receives and conditions the signals from 8 of the 16 CSS. After conditioning, the CSS 
signals are converted to digital values for use by the Safehold controller and supplied to the MP 
for use in other control modes. A field programmable gate array (FPGA), located on the SDN, 
controls the conversion. Since a fully determined Sun vector can be achieved with any 7 of the 8 
CSSs, each ACE is considered single-fault tolerant of a CSS failure. 
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Figure 3: Block diagram of the SDO Attitude Control Electronics 
The ACEs also receive the positive and negative integrated rate pulses from all six TARA axes. 
The pulses, which represent accrued displacements of 0.5 arcsec, are accumulated in six registers 
in the FPGA on the SDN card. The value in the register represents the total angular displacement 
about that axis since the register was last reset. The registers are provided to the ACT and used 
by Safehold to derive rates that are only used when the observatory is in eclipse. 
Each ACE contains all the necessary interfaces to drive the valves and thrusters of the propulsion 
subsystem. The ACE provides the command interface to the pyrotechnic valves. Some of these 
valves are used to pressurize the propellant delivery system after separation from the launch 
vehicle. Others are used to convert the propulsion system to "blow-down" mode after arrival in 
mission orbit. A final pyrotechnic valve will be used at the end of the mission to reopen the 
pressurization path and allow the system energy to be minimized for disposal. The ACE also 
supplies the command and telemetry interface to the propulsion system latching valves. These 
latching valves can be actuated repeatedly to open or isolate various parts of the propulsion 
system throughout the mission. Finally, the ACE incorporates the necessary drive electronics to 
command the ACS thrusters and main engine. Although all of these propulsion system interfaces 
are implemented in the ACEs, the Safehold controller does not interact with them. All normal 
propulsive operations are accomplished through the ACT only. 
The ACE interface to the four RWAs is through the reaction wheel interface card (RWIC). The 
tachometer pulses from each RWA are collected in four registers on the RWIC. Each RWIC also 
has four latching relays that are used to arbitrate control of the four RWAs. The relays allow 
either analog torque commands or ground reference voltage to be connected to each ACE RWA 
output. Since each RWA accepts the inputs from both ACEs in a summing junction, it is 
necessary to ground the unused input. An ACE has the ability to assume control of the RWAs by 
switching the state of its own four relays to provide control signals and switching the four relays 
in the other ACE to ground. The ACEs do not have the capability to give control to the other 
ACE. Only the in-control ACE supplies the analog torque commands from either the ACT or 
Safehold, depending on arbitration results with the MP. 
To establish a simple monitoring system between the ACEs, each ACE sends a two-bit status 
counter to the other, referred to as the "I'm O K  or IMOK signal. The transmit and receive 
registers are both located in the SDN FPGA. These counters normally cycle from 0 to 3, 
incrementing each ACE cycle, when the ACE is operating normally. These counters are an 
integral part of the ACE arbitration scheme. 
The control arbitration can be broken into two distinct elements. The first is ACE arbitration, that 
is, which ACE is in control and sending commands to the RWA. The second is Safehold 
arbitration, that is, whether the ACE is passing MP commands to the actuators or is in Safehold 
mode and sending its own RWA commands, ignoring the MP actuator commands. 
Normally, for ACE arbitration the in-control ACE is determined at observatory power-on and the 
startup of the processors. During startup each ACE confirms communication with its RWIC; if 
successful, the ACE will begin providing IMOK signals at completion of power-on. The 
in-control ACE is then determined based on the ACE with the majority of the eight relays. In the 
unlikely .event of a tie, a TSMJRTS combination on the MP selects the backup ACE. Upon 
establishing the majority, the in-control ACE will then take control by pulling all relays to it (and 
grounding the other ACES relays). This ACE will also disable its response to a loss of IMOK 
signals from the backup ACE. The backup ACE will also transmit its IMOK; however, it will 
enable its response to a loss of IMOK from the in-control ACE. In subsequent cycles each ACE 
will transmit its IMOK so long as analog-to-digital conversion (ADC) is successful for all eight 
CSSs. If either a hardware or software error causes the IMOK from the in-control ACE to be 
interrupted, an IMOK failure counter on the backup ACE is incremented. If this counter reaches 
60 ACE cycles, the backup ACE will interpret this as an indication of failure of the in-control 
ACE and pull control of the RWAs. If the IMOK from the in-control ACE is reestablished for 10 
cycles prior to the backup taking control, the failure counter will be reset to 0 and the backup 
will continue monitoring the IMOK signal fi-om the in-control ACE. 
The same FPGA that sends and receives the IMOK also performs the CSS ADC and provides the 
interface to the TARA integrated rate pulses, and is therefore critical to proper Safehold 
functionality. Therefore, a test was established to reduce the risk that an ACE with a 
malfunctioning FPGA would take control. This is the FPGA read back test. The value written 
into the register that provides the IMOK to the other ACE is read back by the transmitting ACE. 
If this value is the same as was written, the FPGA is assumed to be functioning normally. A bad 
read back on the in-control ACE has no effect except an indication in telemetry. A failed read 
back on the backup ACE, however, will result in any value of IMOK received being treated as 
correct. The FPGA read back test can be overridden by command. 
For Safehold arbitration, the in-control ACE monitors the health of the MP similarly to how the 
backup ACE monitors the in-control ACE. The MP is normally in control, and the in-control 
ACE normally passes MP commands on to the actuators with a small amount of conditioning 
and quality checlung (Normal mode). Should the IMOK signal from the MP be interrupted for 
more than a table-defined number of ACE cycles, the in-control ACE will replace the MP RWA 
torque commands with those generated from its own Safehold task (Safehold mode). The ACE 
may also be commanded to Safehold, with the same result. Recovery from Safehold is 
accomplished by reestablishing observatory command through one of the MPs and commanding 
the in-control ACE back to Normal mode. 
CONTROL MODE PERFORMANCE 
The hardware-specific and ACE arbitration FDC is designed to address the known failure paths 
in the SDO ACS design as understood by designers and systems engineers. However, the 
possibility of an overlooked path from a single fault to mission loss leads to additional checks 
that the ACS is performing correctly. FDC based on control mode performance is qualitatively 
similar to performance requirements on the five ACT modes. Attitude errors and angular rates 
should normally remain low, and FDC checks these quantities. However, the actual performance 
values set as goals for the design and testing of those control modes are not necessarily the 
standards used in the detection of failures. For instance, though the control performance 
requirement on the Inertial mode controller is in the range of arcseconds, no real hazard exists 
inherently in attitude excursions even out to the level of degrees. Instead, the FDC performance 
failure levels are set to be enough outside of expected performance, as based on analysis and 
simulation, that excursions beyond those levels are not expected except in the case of hardware 
failure. 
Table 2 shows the FDC based on control mode performance. The format is similar to the 
hardware-specific FDC. The ACT control modes that run on the MP are described above, but are 
listed again here for easy reference: Sun Acquisition (SA), Inertial (IN), Science (SCI), DeltaH 
(DH), and DeltaV (DV). 
FDC conditions based on control mode performance all depend on at least two logical criteria to 
activate: 1) each must meet its described condition in telemetry, and 2) the ACT must be 
operating in the specified mode. So, the RTS in response to IN-2, for example, will not be 
commanded unless both the listed condition is true for the entire persistence period and the ACT 
is in Inertial for the entire persistence period. Because Sun Acquisition mode is expected to take 
some time to acquire its target, as opposed to all other modes, which essentially begin on their 
targets, an additional mode restriction is placed on the SA-1 performance check. Before the TSM 
indicates failure at all, the MP must have been in Sun Acquisition mode for at least 30 minutes. 
This restriction prevents normal operation of Sun Acquisition, which can take up to 30 minutes 
to acquire the Sun, from triggering the SA-1 TSM and issuing 5 failure event messages per 
second for 30 minutes during normal operations. 
The responses to control mode performance faults are nearly all mode demotions; the one 
exception-SCI-&is useful more for monitoring of an unexpected condition than for automated 
response. Sun Acquisition mode is the usual mode of choice, though sometimes Inertial mode is 
selected. Two conflicting ideas are at work in this design. One idea is to demote in incremental 
steps, allowing each new state the possibility of recovering a stable configuration and 
lengthening the amount of time before all possible automated responses are exhausted. The other 
is to isolate the system as much as possible from the total condition at the time of the fault. Both 
are sensible, and for the SDO ACS, the second is usually the proper choice. The SDO Sun 
Acquisition mode is extremely robust to failures of any of the hardware complement. It is 
capable of maintaining adequate power on the solar arrays even in many double-fault conditions. 
Since it is primarily dependent on the CSSs, and since no other MP mode uses those sensors, Sun 
Acquisition provides the most complete safe harbor from hardware problems that may disturb 
other control modes. The exceptions to this reliance on Sun Acquisition are cases in which it is 
highly likely that a software glitch would cause the fault, such as if the MP warm resets, or in the 
special case of a Science mode GT problem. In the case of a GT problem, Inertial mode is a safe 
harbor because it does not use the GTs in any way. Of course, a failure of Sun Acquisition to 
acquire the Sun can only be addressed by hoping the problem lies in the ACE in control or in a 
severe TARA fault and switching to Safehold on the backup ACE, which is independent of the 
TARAs. 

















SYSTEM HEALTH AND SAFETY 
The big net that catches any faults that fall or cascade through the other three levels is the FDC 
for system health and safety. These tests check the specific quantities that either represent direct 
threats to the spacecraft, such as large angular momentum or Sun angle values, or that involve 
multiple inputs such that the error source may be difficult to trace, such as convergence of the 
Kalman filter. Table 3 is divided into 4 sub-categories: hazardous physical conditions (HAZ); 
ephemeris checks (EPH), which mainly feed into other FDC; checks on the status of the 
extended Kalman filter (KF); and cross-checking of attitude sources using Sun vectors (ATT). 
The first three HAZ checks look at the system angular momentum. HAZ-1 and HAZ-2 are 
essentially the same test, but with different limits. The lower limit has a slower response, and 
would respond to a gradual build-up of momentum that is not likely to be caused by a 
concentrated external torque. Conversely, the higher limit has a very rapid response, with the 
assumption being that, since the lower limit test was not triggered, there is an actual leakage 
from the propulsion system (SDO has no dewars, so the propulsion system is the only potential 
source of rapid gas expansion). The third test looks for the same possibility, but tries to catch it 
before it reaches a high momentum. HAZ-2 and HAZ-3 have the same response, so there is no 
danger in having these two tests racing each other-in fact, that is the intention. 
Condition 
Sun angle exceeds 15 deg and 
ACS mode timer exceeds 30 minutes 
Attitude error exceeds 5 deg 
Angular rate exceeds 0.3 deg/sec 
Angular rate exceeds 0.3 deg/sec 
CGT outside linear range 
CGT outside of acquisition range or invalid 
Roll attitude error exceeds 10 arcseconds 
Time in DeltaH exceeds 7.5 min . 
Magnitude of the system angular momentum 
error exceeds limit 
Attitude error exceeds 5 deg 
MP performs a warm restart 
ACE in control performs warm restart 
Thruster commands cancelled (see PROP-1,2) 
Time in Delta V exceeds commanded time 
Anrmlar rate exceeds limit , u 
1) Go to Sun Acquisition Mode 
1) Go to Inertial Mode 
1) Go to Sun Acquisition Mode 






1) Go to Safehold on other ACE 
1) Go to Sun Acquisition Mode 
1) Go to Sun Acquisition Mode 
1) Go to Sun Acquisition Mode 
1) Go to Inertial mode 
1) Go to Inertial mode 
0) Set a flag warning that the attitude 
excursion might affect the science data 
1) Go to Sun Acquisition Mode 
1) Go to Sun Acquisition Mode 
1) Go to Sun Acquisition Mode 
1) Go to Previous Mode 
1) Go to Sun Acquisition Mode 
1) Go to Sun Acquisition Mode 
1) Go to Inertial Mode 





Attitude error exceeds 5 deg 
MP performs warm restart 
ACE in control performs warm restart 

















Ephemeris faults all result in the ephemeris validity flag being set to Invalid until reloaded by the 
FOT. Then, KF-1 does not use any sensor inputs for any cycle in which the ephemeris is flagged 
as invalid. Other Kalman filter checks similarly exclude one or all of the three fine attitude 
sensors (ST #1, ST #2, and DSS) from use in the filter, either for one cycle or until reset by the 
FOT. KF-8 then sweeps up those results into a holistic check on the health of the fine attitude 
pointing. The Kalman filter can really only be trusted to provide accurate attitude solutions when 
it receives accurate data from any two of the three fine attitude sensors. One sensor is sufficient 
for safe operation, though not for meeting knowledge requirements, but this is not an expected 
state for the ACS and may indicate a more insidious problem. So, KF-8 monitors whether the 
filter is in fact receiving suitable data from two sensors. If a sufficient time passes without two 
accurate measurements, then KF-8 responds by changing to Sun Acquisition mode, which is the 
safest MP mode, since it does not use the Kalman filter at all. Some of the other KF conditions, 
such as the divergence of the filter, are an immediate threat; continued divergence of the Kalman 
filter can result in "not-a-number" operations, which can eventually cause reset of the MP 
software. These conditions will also send the MP to the safety of Sun Acquisition mode until the 
Kalman filter problem can be isolated. If any collection of human error, ground or flight software 
error, subtle hardware error, or unfortunate radiation or dynamic events sufficiently corrupts the 
KF in any of these several ways, then one or more KF conditions will be met, and the spacecraft 
will end up in Sun Acquisition. 
The ATT conditions are all interconnected, and are only checked when the spacecraft is not in 
eclipse. There are four sources of calculated Sun vectors in the onboard software: the CSS Sun 
vector from ACE A (CSS-A), the CSS Sun vector from ACE B (CSS-B), the DSS Sun vector, 
and the Sun vector estimated in the SDO body frame by rotating the inertial-referenced Sun 
location from the ephemeris into the body reference frame using the current attitude quatemion. 
Each of the four conditions has one of these Sun vectors being voted out by two other sources 
that agree with each other to within a few degrees. Then, the responses isolate the ACS from the 
faulty measurement. If CSS-A is faulty, then that ACE cannot be trusted if Safehold were 
needed. Since ACE A is the nominally in-control ACE, FDC places ACE B in control of the 
spacecraft using its Sun vector measurements, which the test has effectively validated against the 
DSS measurement. If instead the ACE B Sun vector is faulty, then transitions to ACE B for other 
FDC reasons are disabled until the problem can be understood. If the DSS is faulty, it is excluded 
from the KF, with the potential consequence of meeting the condition for KF-8 if, for example, 
ST-1 is occulted. Finally, if the AD solution is faulty, Sun Acquisition is entered as the only MP 
mode that is independent of the AD processes. 
Table 3: System Health and Safety FDC 
ID I Condition I Response I Persistence 









Total angular momentum exceeds 50 Nms 
Total angular momentum is increasing faster 
than 3 Nms per 200-rnsec cycle 
CSS Sun Angle exceeds 45 deg 
Ephemeris Uplink Error 
Magnitude of the spacecraft postion vector is 
outside the specified range 
KF-4 
I not occulted by Earth, Sun or Moon I 1)  isa able KF use of ST and Reset KF I 1) 10 min 
KF-7 I DSS coarse residual exceeds limit but SDO I 0) Drop sensor measurement 1 0) In-line 
Ephemeris propagation has been running 
more than 20 days 
Ephemeris is flagged as invalid 
Kalrnan Filter is not converged 
KF-5 
KF-6 
1) Close propellant isolation valves and 
remove power ffom thruster coils 
1) Close propellant isolation valves and 
remove power fiom thruster coils 
1) Go to Sun Acquisition Mode 
0) Reject Ephemeris Load 
0) Set ephemeris validity flag to invalid 
KF covariance diagonal has a negative value 
KF covariance has diverged 








0) Set ephemeris validity flag to invalid 
0) Exit KF Routine for 1 cycle 
1) Reset KF 
2) Disable KF and Go to Sun Acquisition 
0) Exit KF for one cycle 
- 
KF dnft bias correction exceeds limit 





1) 5 rnin 
2) 10 rnin 
0) In-line 
1) Reset KF 
2) Disable KF and Go to Sun Acquisition 
0) Exit KF for one cycle 
1) Reset KF 
CSS-A equal CSS-B and I ATT-3 I 
either CSS-A not equal DSS 1 1) Disable DSS from KF indefinitely 
1) 5 sec 
2)10 sec 
0) In-line 
1) 5 sec 
2) Disable KF and Go to Sun Acquisition 
1) Reset KF 
2) Disable KF and go to Sun Acquisition 
0) Drop sensor measurement ffom KF 
-
is not in eclipse 
For two or more of the fine attitude sensors 
(ST-1, ST-2 or DSS), for any reason, the 
sensor measurement was not used by the KF 
ATT-1 
ATT-2 
2) 10 sec 
1) 30 sec 
2) 60 sec 
0) In-line 
1)  isa able KF use of DSS and reset KF 
1) Go to Sun Acquisition Mode 
1 either CSS-A not equal AD or CSS-B not eaual AD 
The following 4 tests compare Sun vectors from 4 sources: CSS-A, CSS-B, DSS, AD. 
A test automaticallv Dasses if one of its sources shows no Sun Dresence. 
or CSS-B not equal DSS 
/ 1) Go to Sun Acquisition Mode 
1 sec 
1 sec 
CSS-A not equal CSS-B and 
CSS-A not equal DSS and 
CSS-B equal DSS 
CSS-A not equal CSS-B and 
CSS-B not equal DSS and 
CSS-A equal DSS 
ATT-4 I CSS-A equal CSS-B 
1) Go to Safehold on ACE-B, because 
CSS-As are suspect 
1) Disable RTSs that go to Safehold on 
backup ACE 
I lm in  
Conclusion 
Fault detection and correction on the SDO is designed in recognition of the value both of 
simplicity and comprehensiveness. All foreseen potential single faults are addressed, but in 
adherence with principles that encourage simplicity. These principles result in an approach that 
limits FDC use for any but recognized threats to health and safety of the observatory, simplifies 
the universe of possible automated responses, and establishes an organization of tests that should 
allow any cascading failures to settle into a communicative, power-positive, thermally safe 
attitude. The FDC organization as developed divides the tests into four broad categories, each 
with its own focus, and each able to respond to problems caused by other FDC in a stabilizing 
way. Hardware-specific checks attempt to isolate hardware faults before they propagate through 
the ACS. ACE arbitration FDC provides a self-policing algorithm for determining which of the 
onboard processors is most fit for attitude control. Mode performance FDC monitors a very 
narrow field of factors against the minimally safe operation of each control mode. System health 
and safety check cross-protect the observatory by addressing direct threats to operation due to 
potentially complex interactions in what is necessarily a complex attitude control system. 
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